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Abstract. Recognizing that trust states are mental states, this paper presents a formal 
analysis of the dynamics of trust in terms of the functional roles and representation 
relations for trust states. This formal analysis is done both in a logical framework 
and  in  a  mathematical  framework  based  on  integral  and  differential  equations. 
Furthermore,  the  paper  presents  formal  specifications  of  a  number  of  relevant 
dynamic  properties  of  trust.  The  specifications  provided  were  used  to  perform 
automated formal analysis of empirical and simulated data from two case studies, 
one  involving  two  experiments  with  humans,  and  one  involving  simulation 
experiments in the context of an economic game. 
1  Introduction 
In the literature, a variety of definitions can be found for the notion of trust. The common 
factor in these definitions is that trust is a complex issue relating to belief in honesty, 
faithfulness, competence, and reliability  of the trusted system actors, see e.g., [5, 6, 7, 13, 
14, 19, 22, 23, 27]. Furthermore, the definitions indicate that trust depends on the context 
in  which  interaction  occurs or  on  the  observer’s  point  of  view.  The  agent  might  for 
example trust that the statements made by another agent are true. Likewise, the agent 
might trust the commitment of another agent with respect to certain (joint) goals, or the 
agent might trust that another agent is capable of performing certain tasks.   
In [21] trust is analysed referring to observations which in turn lead to expectations: 
‘observations that indicate that members of a system act according to and are secure in the 
expected  futures  constituted  by  the  presence  of  each  other  for  their  symbolic 
representations.’ In [8] it is agreed that observations are important for trust, and trust is 
defined as: ‘trust is the outcome of observations leading to the belief that the actions of 
another  may  be  relied  upon,  without  explicit  guarantee,  to  achieve  a  goal  in  a  risky 
situation.’ Elofson [8] notes that trust can be developed over time as the outcome of a 2  Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur, and Dmytro Tykhonov 
 
series  of  confirming  observations.  The  evolution  of  trust  over  time,  also  called  the 
dynamics of trust, is addressed in this paper. 
We conceive trust as an internal (mental) state property of an agent that may help him 
to conduct various kinds of complex behaviour. The cognitive concept trust enables the 
agent to effectively cope with complex environments that are populated by self-interested 
agents. Trust is based on a number of factors, an important one being the agent’s own 
experiences with the subject of trust; e.g., another agent. Each event that can influence the 
degree of trust is interpreted by the agent to be either a trust-negative experience or a 
trust-positive experience. If the event is interpreted to be a trust-negative experience, the 
agent will lose its trust to some degree, if it is interpreted to be trust-positive, the agent 
will gain trust to some degree. The degree to which trust is changed depends on the 
characteristics of the agent. Agents equipped with a concept of trust perform a form of 
continual verification and validation of the subjects of trust over time. For example, a car 
is trusted, based on a multitude of experiences with that specific car, and with other cars 
in general. 
In this paper the dependence of trust on experiences obtained over time is the main 
focus, abstracting from other possible influences, which (as a form of idealisation) are 
assumed not present or constant. The dynamics of trust are formalised by sequences of 
mental  states.  The  functional  roles  and  the  representation  relations  of  trust  states  are 
formalised both in a logical and in a numerical mathematical way based on integral and 
differential  equations.  Properties  of  trust  dynamics  are  formalised  accordingly, 
incorporating  logical  and  numerical  aspects.  Empirical  and  simulated  data  from  two 
experiments  with  trust  are  formally  analysed  using  an  automated  checker  for  such 
properties against traces [2]. The first experiment, called the scenario case study, studies 
dynamics of trust of humans when confronted with two different scenario’s. The other 
experiment, called the Trust & Tracing case study, is an agent-based simulation of an 
economic game. 
Section  2  sketches  the  preliminaries  for  modelling  trust  dynamics  using  both 
mathematical and logical means. To properly catch the dynamics of trust as a cognitive 
phenomenon, Section 3 describes trust states as mental states for which the functional or 
causal roles and representation relations can be analysed and formally specified in logical 
terms. In Section 4 a continuous approach to trust dynamics is presented showing how 
functional role and representation relation specifications for trust states can be defined 
within Dynamical Systems Theory [25]. Section 5 presents a number of formally specified 
properties of trust used to analyse the case studies. The scenario case study is presented in 
Section 6; its formal analysis, based on properties formalised in Section 5, is presented in 
Section 7. The Trust & Tracing case study is presented in Section 8 and analysed in 
Section 9, using the properties from Section 5. Section 10 is a discussion. 
2  Preliminaries 
In this paper, trust is considered a mental agent concept that depends on experiences. This 
is  modelled  by  a  mathematical  function that  relates  sequences of  experiences to  trust 
representations: a trust evolution function. As a computational alternative the iterative 
trust update function relates a current trust representation and a current experience to the 
next trust representation. To obtain a formal mathematical framework, the following four 
sets are introduced. A partially ordered set EV of experience values, a linearly ordered Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments  3
 
time  frame  TIME  with  initial  time  point  0,  the  set  ES  of  experience  sequences,  i.e., 
functions from TIME to EV, and a partially ordered set TV of trust values. Examples of such 
sets EV and TV are the (closed) interval of real numbers between -1 and 1, the set {-1, 0, 1}, 
or sets of qualitative labels, such as {very high, high, neutral, low, very low}. Within the sets EV 
and  TV,  subsets  of  positive  and  negative  values  are  distinguished.  A  trust  evolution 
function is a function te : ES x TIME ® TV. A trust update function is a function tu : E x TV ® 
TV. Throughout this paper we assume that the value of a trust evolution function te at time 
t only depends on the experiences in the past of t (future independence). 
A logical formalisation is based on the language TTL [2]; this is a language in the 
class of reified predicate logic-based temporal languages as distinguished in [11, 12]. In 
TTL, state atoms are atoms over the state ontology Ont, such as experience(v) and trust(w), 
which express the experience value v from sort EV and trust value w from sort TV in a 
state, and for relations for these sorts such as <, pos and neg. A state is a truth assignment 
(of truth values true and false) to the set of (ground) state atoms; STATES(Ont) denotes the 
set of all states over state ontology Ont. A trace for state ontology Ont is a function g: TIME 
® STATES(Ont); they form the set TRACES(Ont). The expression state(g, t) |= p denotes that 
state property holds in the state of g at time t. Here |= is an infix predicate of the language. 
Based  on  such  atoms  formulae  can  be  formed  using  the  predicate  logic  connectives, 
including quantifiers (e.g., over time and traces). 
3  Trust States as Mental States 
Following  literature  on  Philosophy  of  Mind,  such  as  [20],  a  mental  state  can  be 
characterised in two manners: 
·  by the functional role it plays, defining the immediate predecessor and successor states 
in causal chains in which it is involved 
·  by its representation relations, defining how the mental state relates to other states 
more distant in locality and time 
For each of these two aspects, trust states will be analysed by a simple example. 
The Shop Example 
Consider the following example, concerning agent A and a specific shop. The behaviour 
of agent A considered is as follows: 
·  agent A can go to the shop or avoid it 
·  when meeting somebody, agent A can tell that it is a bad shop or that it is a good shop 
The following types of events determine the behaviour of agent A 
negative events: 
·  an experience that a product bought in this shop was of bad quality  
·  somebody else tells A that it is a bad shop 
·  passing the shop, A observes that there are no customers in the shop 
positive events: 
·  an experience that a product bought in this shop was of good quality  
·  somebody else tells A that it is a good shop 
·  passing the shop, A observes that there are customers in the shop 
Assume for the sake of simplicity that only the last two experiences count for the 
behaviour of A, and that the past pattern a considered are histories in which the last two 
experiences are negative events. The future pattern b considered are the futures in which 
the agent avoids the shop and, when meeting somebody tells that it is a bad shop. It is 
assumed that, viewed from an external perspective, past pattern a leads to future pattern b. 4  Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur, and Dmytro Tykhonov 
 
Functional Role Specifications for a Trust State 
Functional roles are described from a backward perspective (relating the trust state to 
states that lead to it) and a forward perspective (relating the trust state to states to which it 
leads). The trust state property ‘very negative’ is used as an illustration. For the forward 
perspective a relatively simple specification can be made; for example: 
Functional role specification: forward 
If the agent has very negative trust about the shop, then it will avoid the shop and when meeting somebody, (s)he 
will speak negatively about the shop. 
state(g, t) |= trust(very_negative) ￿ $t1³ t  [  t￿t1￿t+d & "t2  [ t1￿t2￿t1+d ￿   
[state(g, t2) |= preparation_for(avoiding_shop)  & 
 state(g, t2) |= conditional_preparation_for(meets(A, B), speaks_bad_about_shop_to(A, B)) ] ] 
Here preparation for an action leads to performing the action (unless it is blocked), and 
conditional preparation for an action leads to preparation for the action as soon as the 
condition is observed. The backward perspective is inherently less simple, since trust is a 
type of mental state property that accumulates over longer time periods. This means that 
trust at a next point in time depends on present experiences but also on the present trust 
state. This gives it a recursive character. For example, 
Functional role specification: backward 
If the agent has negative or very negative trust about the shop, and it has a negative experience, then it will have 
very negative trust. 
[state(g, t) |= trust(negative) Ú trust(very_negative)  &  
 state(g, t) |= observes(e) & neg(e) ]  ￿ 
     $t1³t  [  t￿t1￿t+d & "t2  [ t1￿t2￿t1+d ￿  state(g, t1) |= trust(very_negative) ] 
A numerical example with trust decay rate r is as follows: 
If the agent has trust level w about the shop, and it has an experience of level v, then it will have trust of level 
rw+(1-r)v. 
[ state(g, t) |= trust(w)  &  state(g, t) |= observes(experience(v))   ￿ 
   $t1³t  [  t￿t1￿t+d & "t2  [ t1￿t2￿t1+d ￿  state(g, t1) |= trust(rw+(1-r)v) ] 
Note that in mathematical terms a backward functional role specification corresponds to a 
trust update function, and can be used directly in a computational manner for simulation. 
Representation Relations for a Trust State 
Trust  is  an  example  of  a  mental  state  property  that  heavily  relies  on  histories  of 
experiences,  as  also  is  found  in  empirical  work;  e.g.  [17].  By  abstracting  from  these 
histories in the form of a trust state that accumulates the history of experiences, the future 
dynamics can be described on the basis of the present mental state in a simple manner. 
Here the past pattern can be characterised by a formula j(g, t): 
   $t1<t2£t [state(g, t1) |= observes(e1) & state(g, t2) |= observes(e2) &  
  neg(e1) & neg(e2)  & 
  "t3  [ t1£t3£t  ￿  Ø $e3  [ pos(e3)  &  state(g, t3) |= observes(e3) ] ] 
Moreover, the future pattern can be characterised by a y(g, t): 
$t1³ t   state(g, t1) |= performs(avoiding_shop)  & 
 " t2 ³ t  [ state(g, t2) |= observes(meeting(A, B))  ￿   
$t3 ³ t2  state(g, t3) |= performs(speaking_bad_about_shop_to(A, B))] 
This  obtains  the  following  temporal  relational  specifications  for  the  representational 
content of the trust state 
Representation relation: forward 
  "g, t    [  state(g, t) |= trust(very_negative)     Û    y(g, t)  ] 
Representation relation: backward 
  "g, t  [  j(g, t)    Û   state(g, t) |= trust(very_negative)  ]   Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments  5
 
A numerical example with trust decay rate r involves summation over time as follows: 
If t0 is a time point and d a duration and t1 = t0+d and the agent has at time point t0 trust level w(t0) and at time 
points t between t0 and t1 it has experiences of level v(t), then at t1 it will have trust of level w(t1) =  r
dw(t0) + 
(1-r)￿0￿d1￿d-1  r
d1v(t0+d-d1). 
This property can be expressed in TTL as follows (here for any formula j, the expression 
case(j, v1, v2)  indicates the value v1 if j is true, and  v2 otherwise): 
    [ state(g, t0) |= trust(w0)  &   
    w1 = r
d w0 + (1-r) Sk=0
d Sv:EV  case(state(g, t0+k) |= experience(v), r
d-kv, 0) 
    ￿ state(g, t0+d) |= trust(w1) ]   
In Section 4 an analysis of representation relations and functional role specifications 
for  continuous  trust  values  over  continuous  time  in  terms  of  the  Dynamical  Systems 
Theory [25] (based on integral and differential equations) will be presented. 
4  A Continuous Approach 
The notions functional role and representation relation can be analysed in a continuous 
form as well. This section considers a continuous mental state property for trust over 
continuous time. As an example, it is assumed that trust in the weather forecast depends 
on one’s experiences based on continuously monitoring the actual weather and comparing 
the observed weather with the predicted weather. For some of the patterns of behaviour, 
decisions may depend on your trust in the weather forecast. In particular, the decision to 
take an umbrella depends not only on the weather forecast, but also on your trust in the 
weather forecast. For example, when the weather forecast is not bad, but your trust is low, 
you still will take an umbrella with you. It is assumed that for each point in time your 
experience with the weather forecast is a modelled by value (real number) between -1 
(negative experience) and 1 (positive experience).  
 
time 
present 
experience 
value 
+  + 
-  - 
1 
-
 
Fig. 1. Trust for continuous experiences without decay  
As a first approach (for reasons of presentation leaving decay aside for a moment) the 
accumulation of experiences in trust may be described by averaging the accumulation of 
the shaded area of the graph of experiences values over time, shown in Figure 1 below. 
So,  a  trust  state  represents  a  kind  of  average  of  the  experiences  over  time.  More 
specifically, the trust value is taken to be the real number indicating the shaded area 
divided by the length of the time interval, where the parts below the time axis count as 
negative. Within an overall trace g the relation between trust value tvg(t) at a certain point 
in time t > 0 and the experience history can be modelled by the following backward 
representation relation for the trust state, expressed by an integral over time until t of the 
experience value evg(t), i.e., 6  Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur, and Dmytro Tykhonov 
 
tvg(t) =  ￿0
t
 evg(u) du / t 
where for a trace g the functions tv, ev are defined by: 
tvg(t) = v     iff   state(g, t, internal) |= has_value(trust, v) 
evg(t) = w     iff   state(g, t, input) |= has_value(experience, w) 
This shows the cumulative character of a (backward) representation relation. A functional 
role specification has a more local character. Such a local relationship can be modelled by 
a differential equation, which can be found from the integral relation  
t  tvg(t) =  ￿0
t
 evg(u) du  
by differentiation and application of the product rule as follows: 
d/dt  t. tvg(t) = d/dt  ￿0
t
 evg(u) du 
(d/dt  t) . tvg(t) + t. d/dt  tvg(t) = evg(t) 
tvg(t) + t. d/dt  tvg(t) = evg(t)   
Therefore the following differential equation is obtained: 
dtvg(t) / dt = [ evg(t) - tvg(t) ] / t 
In discretised form this provides: 
tvg(t+ Dt) = tvg(t) + [[ evg(t) - tvg(t) ] / t ]  Dt 
This shows the backward functional role specification for a trust state, which has the form 
of a trust update function and can be used for simulation (based on Euler’s method; also 
the more efficient higher-order Runge-Kutta methods are applicable). 
The example shows that, for continuous models, characterisations of representation 
relations  and  functional  role  specifications  show  up  that  are  formulated  in  terms  of 
integrals or differential equations. This provides an interesting connection of the higher-
level cognitive concept trust to the Dynamical Systems Theory as advocated, for example, 
in [25]. In the above example, it is not realistic that experiences very far back in time 
count the same as recent experiences. In the accumulation of trust, experiences further 
back in time will have to count less than more recent experiences, based on a kind of 
inflation  rate,  or  increasing  memory  vagueness.  Therefore  a  more  realistic  model  is 
obtained if it is assumed that the graph of experience values against time is modified as 
shown below to fit it between two curves that are closer to zero further back in time. Trust 
then is the accumulation of the areas in the graph below, where the parts below the time 
axis count negative. 
1
-1  time 
-  -  - 
+  +  + 
+    + 
present 
 
Fig. 2. Trust for continuous experiences with decay 
The limiting curves can be based, for example, on an exponential function e
at with a > 0 
a real number related to the strength of the decay. The graph in Figure 2 depicts the Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments  7
 
resulting function  evg(t) e
at. Under these assumptions the representation relation between 
trust and experiences can be modelled by the integral 
tvg(t) =  ￿0
t
 evg(u) e
au du . a / (e
at - 1) 
where the factor a / (e
at - 1) is a normalisation factor to normalise trust in the interval [-1, 1]. 
As before, a functional role specification for the trust state in the form of the following 
differential equation can be obtained: 
dtvg(t)/dt   = [ evg(t) - tvg(t) ] . a e
at / (e
at - 1) 
= [ evg(t) - tvg(t) ] . a  / (1 – e
-at
) 
5  Properties of Trust 
In [18] a number of possible properties of trust evolution and trust update functions are 
defined in mathematical terms. For motivation and further explanation we refer to the 
reference  mentioned.  This  paper  contributes  formalisation  of  the  properties  in  logical 
terms. The following properties from [18] are considered (here e,fÎES, gÎTRACES, s,t,u Î TIME, 
vÎEV, wÎTV, and e|£t denotes the restriction of sequence e to time points £ t). 
Future independence  Future independence expresses that trust only depends on past 
experiences, not on future experiences. This is a quite natural assumption that is assumed 
to hold for all trust evolution functions. In mathematical terms: 
e|£t = f|£t  & te(e, 0) = te(f, 0)     ￿  te(e, t) = te(f, t)   
This property can be expressed logically in TTL [2] as follows: 
"g1, g2, t   [ "w [ state(g1, 0) |= trust(w) Û state(g2, 0) |= trust(w) ]  & 
"t1£t  "v [ state(g1, t1) |= experience(v) Û state(g2, t1) |= experience(v) ] ] ￿  
"w [ state(g1, t) |= trust(w) Û state(g2, t) |= trust(w) ] 
Note that as the property refers to two different histories (and compares them), it cannot 
be expressed in modal temporal logic: then only reference can be made to one history. 
Limited  memory  d    Limited  memory  expresses  that  trust  only  depends  on  past 
experiences in a certain time interval of duration  d back in time from the present. In 
mathematical terms: 
e|³t-d = f|³t-d  ￿  te(e, t) = te(f, t)   
This property can be expressed logically in TTL as follows: 
"g1, g2, t   [ "t1£t  [ t1³t-d ￿  
"v [ state(g1, t1) |= experience(v) Û state(g2, t1) |= experience(v) ] ] ￿  
"w [ state(g1, t) |= trust(w) Û state(g2, t) |= trust(w) ] 
Trust Monotonicity  Monotonicity expresses that the more positive experiences are, the 
higher the trust. Mathematically: 
e £ f   &   te(e, 0) £ te(f, 0)      ￿    te(e, t) £  te(f, t) 
Note that this property again refers to two different histories; it can be expressed 
logically as follows: 
"g1, g2, t     
[ "w1,w2 [ state(g1, 0) |= trust(w1) & state(g2, 0) |= trust(w2) ￿ w1£w2]  &  "t1£t  "v1,v2  
[ state(g1, t1) |= experience(v1) & state(g2, t1) |= experience(v2) ￿ v1£v2]  ] ￿  "w1,w2 [ state(g1, t) |= 
trust(w1) &  state(g2, t) |= trust(w2) ￿ w1£w2] 
The two different histories again imply that this property cannot be expressed in modal 
temporal logic. 
Positive trust extension  Positive (or negative) trust extension expresses that trust is 
increasing if only positive (negative) experiences are encountered, i.e., after a positive 8  Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur, and Dmytro Tykhonov 
 
(negative) experience, trust will become at least as high (low) as it was. In mathematical 
terms: 
"s,t  ["u Î TIME [ s £ u < t  ￿ eu  positive  ]   ￿   te(e, s) £ te(e, t) 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
"s,t   ["u "v [ s £ u < t  &  state(g, u) |= experience(v)  ￿  pos(v) ] ] 
￿  "w1,w2 [ state(g, s) |= trust(w1) & state(g, t) |= trust(w2) ￿ w1£w2] 
Trust Flexibility: degree of trust gaining d  The property degree of trust gaining (or 
dropping) expresses, independent of the trust state, after how many positive (or negative) 
experiences trust will be positive (or negative). In mathematical terms: 
"t   ["k Î TIME [ t-d < k £ t  ￿ ek negative ]  ￿   te(e, t) negative 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
"t, d  [ state(g, t) |= trust(w) & "t1  [ [t-d£t1£t  &  state(g, t1) |= experience(v) ]  ￿ pos(v) ]  ￿  pos(w) ] 
Positive limit approximation  Positive limit approximation expresses that it is always 
possible  to  reach  maximal  trust,  if  a  sufficiently  long  period  with  only  positive 
experiences is encountered (the same for the negative case). Mathematically: 
If a t exists such that for all s > t it holds that es is maximal (in EV),  
then a  t' exists such that te(e, t) is maximal (in TV) for all t > t'. 
This property can be expressed logically as follows: 
$t "t1³t [ state(g, t1) |= experience(v) ￿ Ø $v1 v1>v ] ￿   
$t' "t1³t' [ state(g, t1) |= trust(w) ￿ Ø $w1 w1>w ] 
This property can be relaxed a bit by specifying a margin such that trust should become 
that close to the maximal value. In [18] also the following properties of trust update 
functions  are  defined  and  related  to  properties  of  trust  evolution  functions.  They  are 
formalised logically as follows. 
Trust Update Monotonicity  A trust update function tu is monotonic if higher experience 
values and higher trust values lead to higher trust update values. In mathematical terms: 
ev1 £ ev2  &  tv1 £ tv2  ￿  tu(ev1, tv1) £ tu(ev2, tv2) 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
"g1, g2, t "v1,v2, w1, w2 [state(g1, t) |= experience(v1) Ù trust(w1)& 
state(g2, t) |= experience(v2) Ù trust(w2) ￿ v1£v2 & w1£w2]  ￿   
"w1,w2 [ state(g1, t+1) |= trust(w1) & state(g2, t+1) |= trust(w2) ￿ w1£w2] 
Positive  and  negative  trust  extension    This  property  states  that  positive  (negative) 
experiences lead to higher (lower) trust values. In mathematical terms: 
  ev  positive  ￿  tu(ev, tv) ³ tv 
This property can be expressed in logical terms as follows: 
"v1,w1,w2 [ [ state(g, t) |= experience(v1) Ù trust(w1) &  state(g, t+1) |= trust(w2) ] ￿ w1£w2] 
Strict positive (negative) monotonic progression This property is a stronger version of 
the previous one and states that positive (negative) experiences lead to strictly higher 
(lower) trust values, as long as this is possible. In mathematical terms: 
ev positive and tv not maximal (in T)  ￿  tu(ev, tv) > tv 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
"v1,w1,w2 [ [ state(g, t) |= experience(v1) Ù trust(w1) & $w3 w3>w1  &  state(g, t+1) |= trust(w2) ] 
￿ w1<w2] 
Negative or positive trust fixation of degree d  After d negative events the agent will 
never trust anymore and its trust will remain the least possible. After d positive events the 
agent will forever trust (even when faced with negative events) and its trust will remain 
maximal. 
"t, d  [ state(g, t) |= trust(w) &  
"t1 [ [t-d£t1£t  &  state(g, t1) |= experience(v) ]  ￿ pos(v) ]  ￿   
"t2³t  [ state(g, t) |= trust(w2) ￿  Ø$w  w>w2 ] Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments  9
 
6  The Scenario Case Study 
This section describes an experiment based on 294 subjects, taken from [17]. From the 
294 subjects, 238 subjects (81%) completed the full questionnaire. The other 19% of the 
subjects were either not able to complete the questionnaire because of technical problems, 
decided to stop during the experiment, or did not respond to a question within a given 
time  limit  of  15  minutes  between  each  two  questions.  Only  the  data  obtained  from 
subjects that fully completed the questionnaire have been used. In the test the effect of 
experiences with an organisation or an object on the trust in that organisation or object is 
measured.  The  effect  of  the  experiences  on  trust  is  measured  by  describing  various 
experiences in small stories and instructing the subject to express his or her trust in the 
object or organisation after having gone through such experiences, using a five-points 
trust rating scale [17]. In this scale, trust value 3 represents neutral trust, value 4 and 5 
represent positive trust, and value 1 and 2 represent negative trust. 
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of trust in Photocopier (upper two), resp. Travel Agency (lower two) experiments, 
both for positive experiences first and negative experiences first 
Each scenario consisted of an introduction and ten distinctive stories, five of which 
were positive (written and validated as to induce trust) and five of which were negative 
(written and validated as to induce distrust). For more details, see [17]. In Figure 3 the 
median of the trust values of the population for both the photocopier and the travel agency 
are plotted. It shows that indeed trust increases when the subject had a positive experience 
and that trust decreases upon a negative experience. There is a clear difference between 
plots starting with negative experiences and plots that start with positive experiences. To 10  Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur, and Dmytro Tykhonov 
 
determine the significance of this difference, a 2-way between subjects ANOVA test was 
performed on the means of the positive and negative experiences within a single scenario. 
The ANOVA test takes both the experience (positive or negative) and the order in which 
experiences are presented (positive-first or negative-first) into account. The results show 
that both factors have an effect on trust in the object or organisation at a significance level 
beyond 0,001. 
7  Analysis of the Scenario Case Study  
The outcomes of the experiments as described in Section 6 and (in particular) the traces 
shown in Figure 3 have been compared to the most relevant dynamic properties from 
Section 5: 
Positive and negative trust extension These properties are satisfied for all four types of 
human traces shown in Figure 3.  
Strict positive and negative monotonic progression These properties failed according to 
the TTL checker [2] for all four human traces, probably due to the low number of possible 
trust values (if there are few trust values to choose from, people do not always choose a 
new trust value after a new experience).  
Trust Flexibility The property succeeds for all four human traces, given the right value 
for d. For example, for the photocopier, 3 negative experiences in a row are sufficient to 
get a negative trust (no matter how positive trust was), and for the travelling agency 2 
negative experiences are sufficient. For the positive side, in both cases only 1 positive 
experience is sufficient to get trust positive again, so the property ‘degree of trust gaining 
1’ holds for both cases. An effect that does occur, however, in the photocopier context, is 
that after a series of negative experiences, the level of trust does not become as high as in 
the case of no negative experiences (see Figure 3). More refined properties than the ones 
above can be formulated to account for this relative form of trust fixation. Notice that in 
the travelling agency context this effect does not occur. 
Positive limit approximation This property assumes that the traces under investigation 
are of infinite length. Therefore, it makes no sense to check it against the traces of this 
case study. (For example, if for t one chooses the last time point of the trace, then the 
property  is  not  very  informative).  However,  analytically  it  can  be shown that  for  the 
photocopier an upper limit of 5 and a lower limit of 2 are reached, whilst for the travel 
agency an upper limit of 4 and a lower limit of 2 are reached.  
Limited memory d According to the TTL checker, this property succeeds for all four 
human traces, given the right value for d. This can be illustrated by considering the same 
example as for Trust Flexibility above: for the photocopier, 3 negative experiences in a 
row are sufficient to get a negative trust (no matter what the previous trust value was), and 
for the travelling agency 2 negative experiences are sufficient. 
8  Trust and Tracing Case Study 
The Trust and Tracing game [24] is a research tool designed to study human behaviour 
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and cultural settings. The game played by human participants is used both as a tool for 
data gathering and as a tool to make participants feed back on their daily experiences. 
The  focus  of  study  is  on  trust  in  a  business  partner  when  acquiring  or  selling 
commodities with invisible quality. There are five roles: traders (producers, middlemen 
and retailers), consumers and a tracing agency. The real quality of a commodity is known 
by producers only. Sellers may deceive buyers with respect to quality, to gain profits. 
Buyers  have  either to rely  on  information  provided  by  sellers  (Trust) or to  request  a 
formal quality assessment at the Tracing Agency (Trace). This costs a tracing fee for the 
buyer if the product is what the seller stated (honest). The agency will punish untruthful 
sellers by a fine. Results of tracing are reported to the requestor only or by public disgrace 
depending on the game configuration. It is possible to ask for a trace before selling the 
product,  the  tracing  report  can  then  be  used  as  a  quality  certificate.  Middleman  and 
Retailers have an added value for the network by their ability to trace a product cheaper 
than a consumer can. 
Commodities usually flow from producers to middlemen, from middlemen to retailers 
and from retailers to consumers. Players receive ‘monopoly’ money upfront. Producers 
receive  sealed  envelopes  representing  lots  of  commodities.  Each  lot  is  of  a  certain 
commodity type (represented by the colour of the envelope) and of either low or high 
quality (represented by a ticket covered in the envelope). The envelopes may only be 
opened by the tracing agency, or at the end of the game to count points collected by the 
consumers.  The  player  who  has  collected  most  points  is  the  winner  in  the  consumer 
category. In the other categories the player with maximal profit wins. 
Sessions  played  until  2005,  see  [16],  provided  insights,  such  as:  participants  who 
know  and  trust  each  other  beforehand  tend  to  start  trading  faster  and trace  less.  The 
afterwards indignation about deceits that had not been found out during the game is higher 
in these groups than it is when participants do not know each other. The objective of [16] 
was to model the behaviour of sellers and buyers using the concept of trust. The model is 
inspired by [19] who define reliability trust as “trusting party’s probability estimate of 
success of the transaction”. This choice allows for considering economic aspects; agents 
may decide to trade with low-trust partners if loss in case of deceit is low. In the paper 
trust is defined as a probability. This choice allows trust to be related with risk. In the 
agent-based simulations of [16], the agent’s trust model is based on tracing results and the 
trust update schema proposed in [18]: 
trustt+1(d
+)=(1-d
+) trustt+d
+  if the experience is positive 
trustt+1(d
-)=(1-d
-) trustt         if the experience is negative 
where trustt represents trust after the t transactions. The value of trust=1 represents complete 
trust, trust=0 represents complete distrust, and trust=0.5 represents complete uncertainty. This 
model  is  an  asymmetric  trust  update  function,  with  either  completely  positive  or 
completely negative experience. A negative experience, or losing something, may have 
stronger impact than a positive experience, or gaining the same thing. This is known as 
the endowment effect [26]. d
+ and d
- are impact factors of positive and negative experiences 
respectively. They are related by an endowment coefficient e.   
d
+  = e d
- ,  0<e￿1 
This  trust  update  function  has  the  following  properties:  monotonicity,  positive  and 
negative trust extension, and strict positive and negative progression. 
Each agent maintains the level of trust it has in the other agents with respect to their 
role as a supplier and uses tracing results to update its trust. A trace revealing deceit has a 12  Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur, and Dmytro Tykhonov 
 
negative effect on trust in the partner as a supplier. If the tracing results suggest that a 
supplier is truthful, this will strengthen trust. Experience values are assigned, taking into 
account empirical data that conclude that “it appears easier to destroy trust than to build 
trust” [1].  This means that negative experience has stronger impact on trust than positive 
experience has. This assumption is reflected in appropriate experience evaluation values: 
ev(pos) = 0.5 and ev(neg) = -1. The value of d and the initial value of tv are agent parameters set 
by the game leader. Usually d = 0.4 and tv = 0.5. 
For  buyers,  trading  entails  the  trust-or-trace  decision.  In  human  interaction,  this 
decision depends on factors that are not sufficiently well understood to incorporate in a 
multi-agent system. Hearing a person’s spoken and visual contact significantly influence 
the estimate of the partner’s truthfulness [4]. To not completely disregard these intractable 
factors,  the  trust-or-trace  decision  is  modelled  as  a  random  process  instead  of  as  a 
deterministic  process.  The  agglomerate  of  all  these  intractable  factors  is  called  the 
confidence factor. The distribution involves experience-based trust in the seller, the value 
ratio of high versus low quality, the cost of tracing, and the buyer’s confidence factor. 
Tracing reveals the real quality of a commodity. The tracing agent executes the tracing 
and punishes cheaters as well as traders reselling bad commodities in good faith. The 
tracing  agent  only  operates  on  request  and  requires  some  tracing  fee.  Several  factors 
influence the tracing decision to be made after buying a commodity. The most important 
factors for the current research are the buyer’s trust in seller and his confidence. Trust is 
modelled as a subjective evaluation of the probability that the seller would not cheat on 
the buyer. It is updated using tracing results: positive tracing results increase the trust in 
seller, negative ones decrease it. Confidence reflects the preference of a particular player 
to trust rather than trace, represented as a value on the interval [0,1]. The other factors are: 
the satisfaction ratio of the commodity (tracing makes more sense for valuable products 
than for products with small satisfaction ratio), and the tracing costs which depend on the 
depth to be traced. If an agent has decided to trace the product it sends a tracing request 
message to the tracing agent. Once the tracing result has been received the agent updates 
its trust belief about the seller. 
Agent models were validated against the game sessions played by the humans (see 
[16] for details). Thus, computer simulations were performed for the same game setups 
with populations of 15 agents: 3 producers, 3 middlemen, 3 retailers, 6 consumers. A set 
of validation game setups (combinations of free parameters of the agent models) was built 
to be able to compare output of the computer simulations and the results of the human 
games.  The  values  of  free  parameters  were  selected  uniformly  from  their  definition 
intervals to confirm the models capability to reproduce desired input-output relationships 
and explore their sensitivities. Some of the highlights of the outcomes are as follows. 
Effects of confidence on tracing  
The difference in output variables with respect to high and low levels of confidence is not 
significant  for  neutral  risk-taking  agents  (i.e.,  agents that  evaluate  the  potential  profit 
equally high as the risk of deception in their buying/selling decision function). For high-
risk-taking agents (i.e., agents that prefer potential profit over the risk of deception) the 
amount of traces decreases for highly confident players and increases for lowly confident 
players. 
Effects of confidence on cheating   
The number of cheats is high for highly confident players in games with dominating 
number of risk-neutral players. Surprisingly, the results show the opposite for risk-taking Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments  13
 
players: some dishonest sellers do not get traced and punished in highly risk-taking game 
configurations, so they are encouraged to continue their fraudulent practices. 
Effects of confidence on certification and guaranteeing 
The increase in number of guarantees for highly confident agents shows that feedback 
links through tracing trust. High confidence leads to a lower number of traces, meaning 
fewer deceptions are discovered and consequently a higher average tracing trust. 
In all experiments, effects of risk-taking attitude are consistent: high risk-taking leads 
to more cheating, less certificates and increased willingness to give guarantees and to rely 
on them. Differences in risk-taking attitude outweigh changes in other parameters. This 
result corresponds with observations from human games. 
9  Analysis of Trust and Tracing Case Study 
The  model  as  introduced  in  the  previous  section  has  been  tested  in  a  case  study. 
According to [15], initial trust and honesty of the agents have the strongest influence on 
the  evolution  of  trust  throughout  the  game.  Thus,  the  following  4  games  with 
homogeneous agents were chosen from the validation set of the game setups to be played 
using the multi-agent simulation system: 
·  Distrusting buyers and dishonest sellers 
·  Distrusting buyers and honest sellers 
·  Trusting buyers and dishonest sellers 
·  Trusting buyers and honest sellers 
Distrusting  buyers  have  a  low  initial  value  of  trust  (0.1)  and  develop  trust  when 
confronted with honest sellers. Vice versa, trusting buyers have a high initial trust value 
(1.0) and decrease it through tracing and discovering cheaters in games with dishonest 
sellers. One additional game was played having only one dishonest agent and in which the 
rest of the agents are all honest and trusting. Each game played is logged as set of traces 
generated by each of the agents. Each trace logs the trust and honesty values, and all 
experiences  influencing  these.  In  the  logs  the  trust  of  an  agent  is  represented  by  the 
predicate  
has_cheating_trust(AgentA,AgentB,trust_value).  
This expression means that AgentA has trust value of trust_value w.r.t.  AgentB. The 
positive  experience  influencing  the  AgentA’s  trust  is  recorded  using  predicate 
successful_trade(AgentA, AgentB). The predicate has_cheated(AgentA, AgentB) represents the negative 
experience (a cheat has been discovered by the tracing agency) that AgentB cheated on 
AgentA. In a similar way agents log their honesty level that is updated in the same way as 
their  level  of  trust.  The  predicate  has_honesty(AgentA,  honesty_value)  represents  the  current 
value of honesty of AgentA. If the predicate potential_cheat(AgentA) holds, then the value of 
the honesty of AgentA decreases. If the predicate punishment(AgentA) holds, then the honesty 
value of AgentA increases. 
The  game  traces  were  checked  against  a  number  of  trust  properties  proposed  in 
Section 5. To this end, the properties of Section 5 have been slightly modified, to make 
them compatible with the predicates as mentioned above. For example, the properties 
have  been  parameterised  with  a  variable  for the trusting  agent  and  a  variable  for the 
trusted agent, and have been checked for all combinations of agents. The results were as 
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Positive and negative trust extension The TTL checker [2] showed that these properties 
hold for the trust model of the software agents in the Trust and Tracing game. This fact 
can be also confirmed analytically by the trust update function (see Section 8).  
Strict  positive  and  negative  monotonic  progression  These  properties  were  also 
confirmed by the TTL checker for all software agents. This is a consequence of the fact 
that  the  software  agents  update  their  trust  using  only  strictly  positive  or  negative 
experiences. 
Trust flexibility The automated checks pointed out that this property holds only for a part 
of the traces for a given value of d. This effect can be explained by the differences in the 
initial value of trust in the agents across the different games. Furthermore, due to the 
randomness of the agent’s partner selection model and the time limits of the games the 
agents  can  have insufficient number  of trades  (experiences) to  establish  positive  trust 
level. For the Trust and Tracing models, the number of positive experiences needed for 
gaining a positive trust is always higher then the number of negative experiences needed 
to gain a negative trust because of the endowment effect (see section 8).  
Positive limit approximation  As explained in Section 7, it makes no sense to check this 
property against traces of finite length. However, analytically it can be shown that the 
trust  update  function  converges  to  the  maximum  level  of  trust  (1.0)  while  the  agent 
perceives a continuous sequence of positive experiences.  
Limited memory d According to the TTL checker this property does not hold for the 
software agents. After each new experience value and performed trust update, the agents 
still remember all the previous experiences. The history of the experiences is weighted, 
meaning that the older an experience gets the lower its weight in the current value of trust. 
In addition, the weight drops exponentially causing the agent to ignore old experiences 
rapidly. 
10  Discussion 
This paper focused on the dependence of trust on experiences over time, abstracting from 
other  possible  influences,  which  are  assumed  as  an  idealisation  to  be  not  present  or 
constant. For trust states as mental states, following literature in Philosophy of Mind such 
as [20], functional role and representation relation specifications were formalised both in a 
logical way and in a numerical mathematical way according to a Dynamical Systems 
Theory approach (based on integral and differential equations; cf. [25]). It is shown how a 
backward functional role specification in mathematical terms corresponds to a trust update 
function in the discrete case and a differential equation in the continuous case and is 
directly usable in a computational manner for simulation. Moreover, it is shown how a 
backward  representation  relation  can  be  obtained  (as  a  repeated  application  of  the 
functional role specification) by a summation (discrete case) or integration (continuous 
case) of the (inflating) experiences over time. 
Trust  may  be  influenced  by  experiences  of  different  types.  This  paper  models 
differences  between  experiences  by  mapping  them  into  one  overall  set  of  distinct 
experience ‘values’. In addition, more explicit distinctions between different dimensions 
of  experience  could  be  made.  Also  other  cognitive  or  emotional  factors  could  be 
integrated,  such  as  the  concept  of  expectation.  The  work  presented  in  [5,  8,  13,  14] Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments  15
 
addresses some of these other aspects of trust, which could be integrated. This is left for 
future work. 
The requirements imposed on models for trust dynamics may depend on individual 
characteristics of agents; therefore, a variety of models that capture these characteristics 
may  be  needed.  The  approach  put  forward  here  enables  the  explication  of  these 
characteristics.  Formal  specification  of  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  models  is 
supported, based on trust evolution functions and trust update functions. Validation has 
taken place on the basis of extensive empirical and simulated data in different contexts. 
To  formalise  and  analyse  dynamic  phenomena,  often  it  is  implicitly  or  explicitly 
claimed that temporal logic, e.g., linear time or branching time temporal logic, is useful; 
e.g.,  [3,  9,  10]  Other  literature  claims  that  the  Dynamical  Systems  Theory,  based  on 
differential equations is a suitable approach to dynamics of cognitive phenomena; cf. [25]. 
In this study it has been found that a number of basic properties for trust dynamics cannot 
be  expressed  in  standard  temporal  logic,  nor  in  the  form  of  integral  and  differential 
equations. For example, the quite elementary property ‘trust monotonicity’ that expresses 
that better experiences lead to more trust is not expressible. The reason for this lack of 
expressivity is the impossibility to refer to and compare different histories. In the logical 
language  TTL  used  here,  traces  are  first  class  citizens;  for  example,  variables  and 
quantifiers can be used over them. In this way explicit reference can be made to histories, 
and they can be compared. 
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